Improving the Use of Bahasa ASEAN

The issue of “Bahasa ASEAN” came up again in Thailand, in a report on Voice TV:

A Chulalongkorn University research “Human Resources Preparation for the Opening of the ASEAN Market” has found that Thai will be another important language of communication and a common language in ASEAN on par with English because Thailand is the center of ASEAN. Lately it’s been found that [people in] the neighboring countries such as Lao PDR, Cambodia and Myanmar have become more interested in learning Thai.

Mr. Sompong Jitpradap, education lecturer, Chulalongkorn University, revealed that given the research findings, preparatory steps should be made to export Thai language teachers for foreigners [to] expand Thai education system. The ASEAN free trade will be an impetus for a more systematic education reform.

At present Thailand has many teachers of Thai language and students in Thai language major. However, the number and the quality of Thai language human resources have not yet been determined.

I previously commented on “Bahasa ASEAN” here, but  I will leave it to Thai blogger Kaewmala to provide her own take on whether Thai can be “Bahasa ASEAN”:

No one can fault the Malaysian or Thai officials for desiring to see their respective national language gain more prominence in the region. Indeed, there would be a lot of benefits, economically, culturally and politically. At the same time, however, no one can deny the importance of English, which is the de facto Bahasa ASEAN.

and

The reality is English will continue to be the most important language in ASEAN for a long time to come—perhaps until Chinese manages to take over. True, not all citizens of ASEAN are proficient in English but it is the only language that all ASEAN member countries have common proficiency and this proficiency will only increase. This is actually where Thai officials and citizens alike should be very, very concerned about: Thais’ dismal English proficiency.

and

The ASEAN market will have a free flow in 2015. That’s barely three years left for Thais to improve English proficiency, if Thais are really serious about moving ahead in ASEAN. Thais should also start learning the languages of our neighbors. Promote Thai language too, of course. All of these can be done, while learning to talk English seriously. After all, it can only help.

Versions of this debate could easily be held in Vietnam, Myanmar, and other ASEAN countries.  The point is that we already have a “Bahasa ASEAN”, and it is English, the language of globalization.  ASEAN can and should support its local languages, but continued improvement in English is a must for cohesion in all three pillars of ASEAN. 

ASEAN Adopts International Negotiating Procedures

Last week’s ASEAN Coordinating Council meeting of foreign ministers in Cambodia adopted “The Rule of Procedures for Conclusion of International Agreements by ASEAN” (ROP).  As described by ASEAN Deputy Secretary General Bagas Hapsoro, “The Rule prescribes the procedures for ASEAN as an inter-governmental organization to enter into agreement with countries, international, regional and sub-regional organizations and institutions in pursuing its external relations as provided for in Article 41.7 of the ASEAN Charter.”  As ASEAN has not yet published the ROP on its website, I provide a copy below. 


I suspect that only international law aficionados will study the ROP in detail.  Yet I think that the ROP does provide some interesting points of relevance to the study of the ASEAN institutions and the AEC.


First, the ROP does not apply to agreements which are negotiated by the ASEAN member states collectively and create obligations for individual member states, namely the various free trade agreements (FTAs).  ASEAN FTAs are actually a collection of 10 bilateral FTAs which share common language and obligations, the product of collective negotiation by ASEAN member states, with the support of the ASEAN Secretariat. 

Second, the ROP illustrates, once again, the determination by ASEAN member states not to create strong supranational institutions.  Under the ROP, the ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies coordinate with the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) on proposals to commence negotiation.   Final approval of the proposals is up to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, or the CPR acting for the foreign ministers. The ASEAN foreign ministers directly or indirectly through the CPR appoint the ASEAN representatives to the negotiation.   The ROP requires the ASEAN representatives to maintain close consultations with the CPR and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies.  Finally, the ASEAN foreign ministers by themselves or through the CPR will specify the manner of concluding the agreement and by whom.

The ROP thus anticipates a case-by-case authorization by the ASEAN foreign ministers (representing the ASEAN member states) for international agreements.  Unlike what the EU does in trade matters, there is no standing delegation of authority by the member states to a central institution like the ASEAN Secretary General or the ASEAN Secretariat.  Rather, the ROP allows for the designation of the ASEAN Secretary General to act on behalf of ASEAN in specifically authorized circumstances.  The ROP also limits the role of the ASEAN Secretariat to that of assisting the designated ASEAN representatives.  The primacy of the ASEAN foreign ministers in the process is firmly set by the ROP.

Now, this tension between national sovereignty and regional institutions is always present in entities such as ASEAN and the EU.  The EU itself is still resolving such tension in other areas of the Community, such as in monetary affairs and foreign policy. So the factors that resulted in the ROP’s approach are not new.

In any event, perhaps this is all the “ASEAN” that the member states can accept at this time.  But it still marks another step in the implementation of the ASEAN Charter, the further commitment to rule of law in ASEAN’s operations.   For now, this should be celebrated.

Rules of Procedure for Conclusion of International Agreements by ASEAN

Rule 1 Scope of Application

1. These Rules specify the procedure for the conclusion of international agreements by ASEAN as an intergovernmental organisation in the conduct of external relations as provided in Article 41(7) of the ASEAN Charter.

2.  These Rules shall not apply to the conclusion of international agreements concluded by all ASEAN Member States collectively and which create obligations upon individual ASEAN Member States.  

Rule 2 Definition

For the purpose of these Rules, “international agreement by ASEAN” (hereinafter referred to as “international agreement”) means any written agreement, regardless of its particular designation, governed by international law which creates rights and obligations for ASEAN as a distinct entity from its Member States.

Rule 3 Authorisation of the Commencement of Negotiation and Appointment of Representative(s)

The proposal to commence a negotiation of an international agreement shall be coordinated with the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN by the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies at the senior officials level. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, on its own or through the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, shall decide on the proposal and shall appoint the appropriate representative(s) to commence the negotiation on behalf of ASEAN.

Rule 4 ASEAN Common Position

1. ASEAN Member States shall coordinate and develop an ASEAN common position pursuant to Article 41(4) of the ASEAN Charter.

2. Such ASEAN common position shall be formulated by the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies at the senior officials level in coordination with the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN. In the formulation of an ASEAN common position, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting may be consulted if and when necessary.

3. The representative(s) as referred to in Rule 3 shall adhere to an ASEAN common position which serves as a basis for negotiation.

Rule 5 Obligation of information and consultation

1. The representative(s) shall ensure that the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies at the senior officials level and the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN are consulted and kept informed of the progress of negotiation.

2. The relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies at the senior officials level or the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN may, at any time, request to be consulted or informed of the progress of negotiation from the representative(s).

3. The relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies at the senior officials level in coordination with the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN may, at any time, give further instruction to the representative(s).

4. The representative(s) may seek further instruction from the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies at the senior officials level.

Rule 6 Initialling of the Draft Text of the International Agreement

When negotiation is completed, the representative(s) may initial the draft text of the international agreement solely for ascertaining the form and content of the negotiated text of such agreement. For the purpose of this Rule, the initialled draft text shall not be deemed as the final text and shall be subject to endorsement pursuant to Rule 7.

Rule 7 Endorsement of the Draft Text of the International Agreement

1. The representative(s) shall submit the draft text of the international agreement to the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies at the senior officials level for endorsement. Such endorsement shall be made in consultation with the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN.

2. The Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN shall submit the endorsed text to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting for its consideration pursuant to Rule 8. This paragraph shall not apply where the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting acts through the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN pursuant to Rule 8, paragraph 4.

Rule 8 Signature and Act of Formal Confirmation

1. The consent of ASEAN to be bound by an international agreement shall be expressed by signature or an act of formal confirmation.

2. The consent of ASEAN to be bound may be expressed by signature of the person appointed pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Rule when:

a. the international agreement provides that signature shall have that effect;

or

b. the intention of ASEAN to give that effect to the signature appears from the full powers issued pursuant to Rule 9, or was expressed during the negotiation.

3. The consent of ASEAN to be bound may be expressed by an act of formal confirmation when:

a. the international agreement provides for such consent to be expressed by an act of formal confirmation;

b. the intention of ASEAN to sign the international agreement subject to an act of formal confirmation appears from the full powers issued pursuant to Rule 9, or was expressed during the negotiation; or

c. the person appointed pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Rule has signed the international agreement subject to an act of formal confirmation.

4.  The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, on its own or through the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, may decide on the signing of, and/or an act of formal confirmation of an international agreement.

5. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, on its own or through the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, may appoint the Secretary-General of ASEAN or any other person to sign the international agreement on behalf of ASEAN.

6. Where a decision on formal confirmation has been taken pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule, the instrument of formal confirmation shall be issued by the Secretary-General of ASEAN.

Rule 9 Full Powers

Where full powers is required, the Secretary-General of ASEAN shall, upon instruction of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on its own or through the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, issue full powers for negotiating and/or signing an international agreement.

Rule 10 Procedure for Amendment, Suspension and Termination

The procedure set forth in these Rules shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the amendment, suspension and termination of international agreements to which ASEAN is a party.

Rule 11 Role of the ASEAN Secretariat

The ASEAN Secretariat shall assist the representative(s) and relevant ASEAN  organs throughout the process of conclusion of international agreements. 

Do FTAs Mean Free Trade Agreements or Fear and Trepidation in ASEAN (The Sequel)?

This week the Jakarta Post reported that after finally implementing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand (AANZFTA), Indonesian agricultural interests fear the worst from increased competition from Australia and New Zealand.  The Post quoted Indonesian Agriculture Minister Suswono as saying ““We’ll still protect our products so that they will remain competitive in the local market . . . . Our codex standards, halal labeling, and sanitary and phytosanitary standards [SPS] are still feasible as instruments for protection, especially for food items that will enter Indonesia.”

If this sounds familiar, it’s because it is. Two years ago I wrote in the late OpinionAsia website about the fear and trepidation among ASEAN industries facing the implementation of the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), and it is reposted below. Substitute “China” with “Australia and New Zealand” and the analysis would be mostly applicable to Indonesia’s predicament as well.

The positive lesson of 2010 was that the ASEAN members largely avoided using trade remedies and other protection measures as a result of the ACFTA.  Indonesia proposed delays to the ACFTA, which were acknowledged and then rejected by China and the other ASEAN members. Proposals to impose blanket tariffs on Chinese goods also were non-starters.

Will these lessons be applied in the Indonesian agricultural sector? Hopefully, but agriculture is always sui generis. Although the AANZFTA contains provisions against using SPS and other measures as non-tariff barriers, Minister Suswono can point to the restrictive SPS measures imposed by Australia on citrus and tropical fruit as the inspiration for his comments. Plus, last year Indonesia faced a ban on cattle exports from Australia, which was later followed by an Indonesian ban on cattle imports from Australia.

SPS-based non-tariff measures may be the last refuge of protectionists, but they remain alive and well in today’s world. If Australia is indeed worried that Indonesia will implement such measures to protect its agricultural industry, then the first place it should start is at home, by reforming its own SPS measures.

Finally, the other ASEAN trading partner that should take note of this dispute is the EU. A few years ago, I worked on a feasibility study on the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA that indicated that EU processed agricultural exports would benefit tremendously from the FTA. This potential row shows that fear of increased competition from those exports will be a major issue as the EU negotiates its bilateral FTAs with the ASEAN countries.

Anyway, here is the original post on “Do FTAs Mean Free Trade Agreements or Fear and Trepidation in ASEAN”, posted on January 10, 2010:

The start of 2010 was celebrated by some, but many Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) industrial interests viewed the new year with great apprehension. For them, January 1 marked the full implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) agreement and ASEAN China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA). The resulting greater market access for goods traded within ASEAN and between ASEAN and China has generated an outcry throughout the regional grouping among those who fear increased competition. How ASEAN copes with this growing mini-crisis of confidence will affect both regional development within ASEAN and the evolution of ASEAN institutions.

Under AFTA and ACFTA, import duties on most goods have now been set to zero percent in the founding ASEAN members of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (similar reductions will take effect in 2015 for the other ASEAN members). The lists of items subject to trade liberalization, the revised rates and the implementation dates were agreed upon within ASEAN and between ASEAN and China years ago.

The industrial sectors in Indonesia and the Philippines, and to a lesser extent, Malaysia, vehemently object to greater market access and greater competition - not when the agreements were being negotiated but during the waning days of 2009. The Indonesian government reacted to industry pressure by proposing last week to renegotiate the ACFTA and may seek delays in implementing AFTA provisions. Other ASEAN members may be tempted to use this opportunity to follow suit.

That Indonesia and the Philippines, with active business lobbies and media, reacted so strongly was somewhat predictable. Nevertheless, that business interests in those countries and elsewhere in ASEAN waited until the last minute, months and years after the negotiation, ratification and implementation of the FTAs, reflects fundamental deficiencies within the region’s operating system. Clearly ASEAN governments and institutions such as the ASEAN Secretariat did not adequately prepare the business sector for trade liberalization. The corporate sector should have been more involved in the process from the earliest stages.

Not that the ASEAN business sector is without blame. Some companies in ASEAN benefited from protection at the national level through tariff and non-tariff barriers yet took no action when threatened with their impending phase-out. Despite having advance warning, both the private and public sectors in many ASEAN countries failed to prepare themselves for the impending trade liberalization.

This unease with the FTAs could even threaten ASEAN institutions. The ASEAN Economic Community, which the FTAs and other agreements on trade and investment underpin, is supposed to be the most developed of the three pillars of ASEAN – with the political-security and socio-cultural communities being the others. A breakdown over the FTAs would thus undermine the credibility of the ASEAN integration process.

Fortunately, the ASEAN Charter appears to be influencing the controversy in a positive manner. The ASEAN Charter provides the foundation for a rules-based operating system for the regional grouping. Thus, despite domestic calls for individual ASEAN members to abrogate their FTA commitments unilaterally, none have done so. Although Indonesia has called for a renegotiation of the ACFTA, it has respected the structures and practices of ASEAN by making its request through the ASEAN Economic Community Council, a new body established by the ASEAN Charter. Thus it will be up to ASEAN as whole to determine how to address Indonesia’s concerns, and how to deal with China should the grouping decide to act accordingly.

It must be remembered that the FTAs will benefit many ASEAN industries with increased market access in China, as well as in India, Australia, Korea and Japan - which have also signed FTAs with ASEAN. The FTAs also mean increased investment in ASEAN by these trading partners. The ASEAN Secretariat and national governments need to explain these benefits both to the business elite and to the masses.

The aforementioned FTAs provide ASEAN members with remedies to protect their industries from unfair and/or increased competition in the form of antidumping and safeguard laws. These laws take time to invoke and administer, but trade and investment policies based on the rule of law will benefit all sectors of ASEAN society in the long run.

The current acrimony over the FTAs represents a failure of government-business outreach that needs to be avoided in the future if ASEAN economic integration is to succeed. If ASEAN institutions and member states can also continue to adhere to the rules-based approach set forth by the ASEAN Charter, then indeed the ASEAN Economic Community will succeed as well.