As 2011 comes to a close,
Cambodian diplomats are hunkered down in Jakarta, completing the final steps in
the transition from Indonesia to Cambodia as ASEAN Chair. Hence this is an appropriate time to assess
how Indonesia fared as ASEAN Chair.
The starting point for this
analysis is a counterfactual premise – Brunei was originally scheduled to be
ASEAN Chair in 2011, but switched places with Indonesia, which was supposed to
be chair in 2013. Indonesia wanted to switch because of other
summit meetings such as the G-20 and, more importantly, its elections due in
2014 (after the switch and the Bali summit, the new order is Cambodia-2012,
Brunei-2013, Myanmar-2014 and Laos-2015).
Hence did Indonesia perform better as ASEAN Chair than Brunei would
have?
The clear answer is yes.
Having the largest member, a
founding member, serve as ASEAN Chair had a significant impact on developments in
2011:
Preah Vihear – the border temple dispute almost resulted in Cambodia and Thailand engaging
in armed conflict. A turn in domestic
Thai politics (e.g., the election victory of Yingluck Shinawatra) defused the
dispute (for now). However, the active
intervention of Indonesia as ASEAN Chair (invoking the dispute resolution
clauses of the ASEAN Charter) helped calm the situation. Acceptance of the ASEAN Chair’s role in the
dispute was crucial, particularly since the other ASEAN institution that could have
become involved, the ASEAN Secretary General, is currently a Thai national
whose role would have been questioned by Cambodia. With
the presence of Indonesian observers, the dispute has receded. Brunei would have had moral weight, but
clearly the heavier diplomatic presence of Indonesia made a difference in this
dispute.
Myanmar
– the continued political and economic reforms in Myanmar were aggressively
supported by Indonesia as ASEAN Chair. A
former military-backed dictatorship which successfully transitioned to a
democracy, Indonesia serves as a useful role model for Myanmar. Indonesia also actively worked to convince the
United States and the West that the reforms are real. This should not be underestimated. If Brunei had been ASEAN Chair, there would
have been a real temptation for President Obama to skip an East Asia Summit in
Bandar Seri Begawan, given his domestic political problems. Yet President Obama had emotional ties to
Indonesia, plus the diplomatic burden of having cancelled previous visits to
Indonesia, so he went. This helped set
up Secretary Clinton’s December visit to Myanmar and the potential lifting of
economic sanctions.
Timor Leste – Indonesia failed to get Timor Leste admitted into ASEAN in 2011. As I have written before, the burden of
bringing in Timor Leste into the ASEAN Economic Community would have been another
unnecessary distraction, especially with the other issues of Myanmar and Preah
Vihear. However, the fact the ASEAN
membership of Timor Leste is now viewed as a likelihood can be attributed to
Indonesia. That Indonesia, the former
occupying power in Timor Leste, is now its biggest supporter, is another irony
of history. If Brunei had been chair in
2011, Timor Leste’s cause would have been further delayed.
I think on other issues,
such as the South China Sea/Spratly and Paracel Islands or even the ASEAN Economic Community,
Indonesia probably did as well as Brunei would have done.
All of this is not to say
that Brunei would have done worse as a hypothetical ASEAN Chair in 2011.
Rather, it is that countries and their leaders meet the challenges that are
presented by history, and in 2011, Indonesia met those challenges well as ASEAN
Chair.
It also does not mean that
small countries will necessary have less influence over events. Small members are even more dependent on
regional integration than large countries, and countries like Cambodia and Laos
more than make up for their lack of economic and political clout with an abundance
of enthusiasm. Furthermore, they and
Vietnam are strong supporters of globalization, given their relatively late
start in joining the international economic community.
Hence 2012 will present its
own set of challenges to Cambodia as ASEAN Chair. It will need to move closer to a definitive
resolution of Preah Vihear. It will need
to work with Vietnam in selecting a new ASEAN Secretary General. It will need to monitor developments in
Myanmar. It will need to push forward on
the AEC agenda. On these points, I think
Cambodia understands what must be done. If the potential distractions of Preah Vihear
can be avoided, I am confident that Cambodia can follow up on Indonesia’s successful
term as ASEAN Chair.
