Every fall the United States has its annual
“Asian” diplomatic season, usually centered around the visit of the U.S.
president to the APEC, and now ASEAN, summits, starting with the (mostly)
American holiday of Halloween on October 31 and ending with the American
Thanksgiving holiday on the fourth Thursday of November. This year, due to combined effect of the U.S.
presidential election heating up after the Republican party officially
nominated Governor Mitt Romney (along with Monday’s U.S. Labor Day holiday)
and this week’s first U.S.-ASEAN
business summit, it seems as if the “American” season has started in ASEAN a
bit earlier than usual.
Last year marked the renewed emphasis by the
U.S. government on Asia, and to a large extent, ASEAN. Whether this is a
“pivot” or “renewed focus” depends on your point of view and is debatable, but
the emphasis is clear. Regardless of whether President Obama or Governor Romney
wins the November 6 election, Asia should remain a top priority for the United
States.
Supporting a stronger ASEAN should be at the
core of U.S. policy in the region. By a
“stronger ASEAN,” I refer both to the individual ASEAN member states and the
ASEAN institutions themselves. The
United States has provided peace and security for the region throughout the
regional grouping’s existence. The ASEAN
member states recognize this, with former adversaries (such as Vietnam) and
long standing allies (e.g., Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand) recognizing the
need to have a stabilizing U.S. presence, particularly with regard to the South
China Sea issues.
However, I believe that the fundamental
interests of United States in the region – peace with economic and political
development, on a sustainable basis – is also served by having strong ASEAN
institutions. The ASEAN Charter’s
ostensible purpose, to formalize the internal operations of ASEAN, is consistent with developing rule of law and good governance for the region. Full implementation of the ASEAN Economic
Community and its constituent agreements (ATIGA, ACIA and AFAS) will promote
both the establishment of the single production base and single market, which
will benefit all of the citizens of ASEAN.
Stronger ASEAN institutions will also mean that ASEAN will be better
able to deal with environmental, health and other human development issues that
can only be addressed on a regional basis.
Finally, stronger ASEAN institutions can also promote peace and
stability in the region.
In other words, what is good for the ASEAN
institutions is also good for the United States, as well as good for any nation
that supports long term peace and stability for the region. The Obama administration has understood
this, for the most part, and has actively engaged ASEAN institutions on all of
these issues.
Yet the United States could do better. The
American re-emphasis on Asia and ASEAN is primarily depicted in diplomatic and
military terms, with less attention paid to American support for ASEAN economic
integration and socio-cultural integration. In other words, it often appears
that the United States is engaged only with the political-security pillar of
ASEAN, and not the other pillars, the economic and socio-cultural pillars.
Let me address the latter. American influence on the socio-cultural
pillar is both understated and less reported.
The United States, through the
U.S. Mission to ASEAN, USAID and other agencies has promoted the socio-cultural
pillar with aid and outreach efforts.
These efforts do not attract the headlines that the political-security
efforts do, but they are still significant.
The American influence on socio-cultural matters in ASEAN must also
include the vast American media industry, which has now expanded to include
social media and the Internet. By and
large, its impact on ASEAN has been beneficial and conducive to human
development.
Where I feel the United States has not fully
engaged ASEAN is in the economic pillar.
The United States does provide support to the ASEAN Economic Community,
such as through the USAID project to promote the ASEAN Single Window
project. To use an other example, in the
last few years the number of trade actions against ASEAN countries has
decreased, with some cases terminated.
But the main U.S. trade initiative in ASEAN, the Trans Pacific
Partnership (TPP), only involves four ASEAN members (Singapore, Brunei,
Malaysia and Vietnam). The sheer depth
and breadth of the TPP talks make it impractical both for some ASEAN members to
join and for the talks to end anytime soon.
The TPP will result in solid, long-term benefits for the ASEAN -4
involved, but where does that leave the other ASEAN members in the meantime?
Meanwhile, ASEAN itself is pushing forward with
its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) program with its other
trading partners. Some TPP issues will be covered in the RCEP talks, but in all
likelihood most won’t. The RCEP and the
TPP are not incompatible, but if the RCEP takes off, the U.S. risks being left
behind as India, China, Korea, Japan and Australia-New Zealand build upon their
existing FTAs with ASEAN. Even the EU is
thinking about an eventual restart of its FTA talks with ASEAN, if Myanmar
really continues on its path of reform.
The Obama administration relies on the TPP
talks because that currently is the only FTA tool it has now. This is largely the result of U.S. domestic
politics that view trade agreements negatively, such that the Obama
administration has been negotiating the TPP without full trade promotion
negotiation authorization from the U.S. Congress.
But again, we could do better, and by “we” I am
referring to both sides of the political debate in the United States. We should give the next President full trade
promotion authority. We should provide
ASEAN an economic program that goes beyond GSP and beyond TIFA, yet without
undermining the TPP talks. The EU has
such “halfway houses” in its own trade agreements, so maybe we should do the
same. Furthermore, we should promote political and
economic reform in Myanmar so that it becomes irreversible. A normal trade relationship with Myanmar,
which is a WTO member, will eliminate a major obstacle to the United States
having deeper and broader economic ties with all of ASEAN.
With progress in the TPP, in Myanmar and in U.S. domestic politics,
perhaps we could also start talking about a U.S.-ASEAN FTA which would cover
some or all of the areas covered by the TPP.
The scope of coverage would depend on what could be agreed upon with
ASEAN members. Unless we start talking
with ASEAN about this possibility, it will never happen.
In sum, America needs to engage all three
pillars of ASEAN. Our efforts with the
political-security pillar are overexposed and our efforts with the
socio-cultural pillar are underexposed, but our efforts with the economic
pillar need augmenting. I hope that the next president will demonstrate the
leadership needed to correct this, and to show that the United States strongly
supports ASEAN’s efforts in all aspects of its regional integration.
