The past few weeks have
brought “the ASEAN way” of non-interference in ASEAN members’ domestic affairs into
conflict with the more interventionist approach frequently found in Western
countries. We also have seen ASEAN voice
its concern over China’s activities in the South China Sea, supported by many
in those same Western countries. What is not apparent to the casual observer is
how “the ASEAN way” is necessary to firm up ASEAN solidarity, which in turn
augments ASEAN’s resolve in dealing with the South China Sea issue as well as
other regional issues.
This week, of course, the Thai military took over
the Thai government in a coup d’etat.
While ASEAN and its members limited their comments to a support for a
return to a normal government and for stability, they refrained from expressing
opinion on how this should occur. That is “the ASEAN way.”
(This might change if
the Thai situation deteriorates into separatism. If that spectre were to arise, ASEAN should
consider making a definitive statement that a region that leaves an ASEAN
member is not automatically a party to the various ASEAN agreements,
particularly the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Economic Community
agreements. This is akin to EU
Commission President Jose Manuel Barosso’s
recent statement regarding an independent Scotland).
Notably, Cambodia, whose
prime minister Hun Sen is close to the Shinawatras and thus is one ASEAN member
who might be inclined to voice opposition to the military coup, has
remained relatively quiet on the issue. This probably reflects Hun Sen’s
own domestic political difficulties and a wish not to draw too much attention
to them.
Western countries took a
more vocal approach and openly called for a return to a democratic
government. As required by its statutes,
the
U.S. imposed sanctions on Thailand, but attempted to limit them so as to
maintain some diplomatic flexibility.
Other governments will similarly attempt a nuanced approach.
However, in dealing with
another ASEAN member, Brunei, there is not as much nuance. Many
in the United States and elsewhere are calling for boycotts of Brunei and
Brunei-owned institutions in protest of Brunei’s imposing sharia law. ASEAN, on the other hand, has remained
relatively quiet on the issue, again following “the ASEAN way.”
Those seeking a more vocal
regional opinion on such issues are often critical of “the ASEAN way”. Yet it is important to recognize that ASEAN
encompasses a wide variety of governments, ranging from democracies of varying
openness to communist one-party states to an absolute monarchy to, for now, a
military junta. Expecting such countries
to adopt a liberal Western democratic system (or its values) overnight is not
realistic, and given examples elsewhere and even within ASEAN itself, forcing
such a result is not advisable.
Rather, “the ASEAN way” may
be a plodding and inconsistent approach, much as it is with the ASEAN Economic
Community, but it can lead to positive results if properly understood and
supported. Years of economic sanctions against the Myanmar regime alone did not
lead to political reform, but combined with the constant, steady influence of
ASEAN, they did convince the country to implement political and economic reform
(hopefully fully).
Furthermore, “the ASEAN way”
promotes confidence in regionalism, as ASEAN members become more comfortable in
ASEAN and the ASEAN institutions without fearing that they will intervene in
their political affairs. In contrast, Mercosur temporarily suspended Paraguay
due to its domestic political situation; that regional body is much less successful
and even has competing regional organizations in South America.
Without having confidence in
its institutions, ASEAN will be less willing to work on a regional basis on
economic development, environmental issues, and yes, security issues like the
South China Sea dispute with China. This is why informed observers in the West
are less vocal on the Brunei sharia issue and call for more flexibility in
dealing with the Thai military junta. That
does not mean those calling for changes in ASEAN countries are wrong; rather,
they need to understand the larger historical and cultural picture involved,
and temper both their expectations and their objectives.
