How the AEC Supports Improved Singapore-Malaysia Relations

Last week the Malaysian and Singaporean prime ministers met in Putrajaya for an annual bilateral summit meeting.   Several economic initiatives were announced, including linking Singapore’s subway system to Johor, the sale of electricity by Malaysia to Singapore, alignment of radio frequency spectrum plans for digital broadcast and mobile broadband services, a proposed ferry service, a new work group on industrial cooperation, and cooperation in aviation and airport services between Senai International Airport in Johor and Changi in Singapore as well as education services.  These initiatives follow up on the Malaysia-Singapore deal last year resolving land and water issues.


All this represents a great improvement. Although Malaysia and Singapore have been close economically, domestic political conditions (particularly in Malaysia) made it difficult to resolve long-standing disputes.  Every so often a dispute would arise (the causeway bridge, sand for Singapore land reclamation, Pedra Branca, airspace for defense training, railway land, water, etc.) and sour relations between the neighbors. 


So what happened to change this?  To some extent, increased reliance on legal mechanisms and agreements to resolve disputes helped. The International Court of Justice resolved the Pedra Branca territorial dispute without acrimony, and the ASEAN regional agreements impose obligations and minimum standards on both Singapore and Malaysia.


The major impetus for better relations comes from domestic politics on both sides of the causeway. 


After the last Malaysian general election, the ruling Barisan National coalition is more dependent than ever on Johor for its parliamentary majority.  In addition, the major plausible threat to Prime Minister Najib Razak comes from Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, whose political base is Johor.  These and other factors motivate the increased efforts to develop Johor state through the Iskandar Malaysia development project. 


The additional factors come from the Singapore side.  Its own general election last year highlighted social and economic pressures in the city-state.  Singapore strives to be an international center in finance and other services, attracting high net-worth global investors and talent like in London.  Unlike London, Singapore does not have a hinterland to provide a larger market or reduce land and wage costs.  As a result, many Singaporeans perceive increased losses of opportunity in employment and education, along with increased living costs.  Hence some portions of the Singapore electorate vented their frustrations by voting against the government.  Economic development and integration with Johor will thus provide Singapore with the hinterland it lost in 1965, and help Singapore alleviate these social and economic pressures.


This confluence of factors, from both Malaysia and Singapore, thus ensure that Iskandar, unlike previous projects in Johor, will be eventually successful.  The “pull” factors in Malaysia are matching up with “push” factors in Singapore.  What the ASEAN Economic Community does is provide the legal and economic framework for cross-causeway cooperation without bumping up against old strictures of sovereignty.  No doubt there will be bumps along the way, but the AEC will allow Malaysia and Singapore to cooperate on mutually acceptable terms. 

Celebrating Indonesia, and Anticipating Cambodia, as ASEAN Chair

As 2011 comes to a close, Cambodian diplomats are hunkered down in Jakarta, completing the final steps in the transition from Indonesia to Cambodia as ASEAN Chair.  Hence this is an appropriate time to assess how Indonesia fared as ASEAN Chair.

The starting point for this analysis is a counterfactual premise – Brunei was originally scheduled to be ASEAN Chair in 2011, but switched places with Indonesia, which was supposed to be chair in 2013.    Indonesia wanted to switch because of other summit meetings such as the G-20 and, more importantly, its elections due in 2014 (after the switch and the Bali summit, the new order is Cambodia-2012, Brunei-2013, Myanmar-2014 and Laos-2015).  Hence did Indonesia perform better as ASEAN Chair than Brunei would have? 

The clear answer is yes.

Having the largest member, a founding member, serve as ASEAN Chair had a significant impact on developments in 2011:

Preah Vihear – the border temple dispute almost resulted in Cambodia and Thailand engaging in armed conflict.  A turn in domestic Thai politics (e.g., the election victory of Yingluck Shinawatra) defused the dispute (for now).  However, the active intervention of Indonesia as ASEAN Chair (invoking the dispute resolution clauses of the ASEAN Charter) helped calm the situation.  Acceptance of the ASEAN Chair’s role in the dispute was crucial, particularly since the other ASEAN institution that could have become involved, the ASEAN Secretary General, is currently a Thai national whose role would have been questioned by Cambodia.   With the presence of Indonesian observers, the dispute has receded.  Brunei would have had moral weight, but clearly the heavier diplomatic presence of Indonesia made a difference in this dispute.

Myanmar – the continued political and economic reforms in Myanmar were aggressively supported by Indonesia as ASEAN Chair.  A former military-backed dictatorship which successfully transitioned to a democracy, Indonesia serves as a useful role model for Myanmar.   Indonesia also actively worked to convince the United States and the West that the reforms are real.  This should not be underestimated.  If Brunei had been ASEAN Chair, there would have been a real temptation for President Obama to skip an East Asia Summit in Bandar Seri Begawan, given his domestic political problems.  Yet President Obama had emotional ties to Indonesia, plus the diplomatic burden of having cancelled previous visits to Indonesia, so he went.  This helped set up Secretary Clinton’s December visit to Myanmar and the potential lifting of economic sanctions.

Timor Leste – Indonesia failed to get Timor Leste admitted into ASEAN in 2011.  As I have written before, the burden of bringing in Timor Leste into the ASEAN Economic Community would have been another unnecessary distraction, especially with the other issues of Myanmar and Preah Vihear.  However, the fact the ASEAN membership of Timor Leste is now viewed as a likelihood can be attributed to Indonesia.   That Indonesia, the former occupying power in Timor Leste, is now its biggest supporter, is another irony of history.  If Brunei had been chair in 2011, Timor Leste’s cause would have been further delayed.

I think on other issues, such as the South China Sea/Spratly and Paracel Islands  or even the ASEAN Economic Community, Indonesia probably did as well as Brunei would have done. 

All of this is not to say that Brunei would have done worse as a hypothetical ASEAN Chair in 2011. Rather, it is that countries and their leaders meet the challenges that are presented by history, and in 2011, Indonesia met those challenges well as ASEAN Chair. 

It also does not mean that small countries will necessary have less influence over events.  Small members are even more dependent on regional integration than large countries, and countries like Cambodia and Laos more than make up for their lack of economic and political clout with an abundance of enthusiasm.  Furthermore, they and Vietnam are strong supporters of globalization, given their relatively late start in joining the international economic community.

Hence 2012 will present its own set of challenges to Cambodia as ASEAN Chair.  It will need to move closer to a definitive resolution of Preah Vihear.  It will need to work with Vietnam in selecting a new ASEAN Secretary General.  It will need to monitor developments in Myanmar.  It will need to push forward on the AEC agenda.  On these points, I think Cambodia understands what must be done.   If the potential distractions of Preah Vihear can be avoided, I am confident that Cambodia can follow up on Indonesia’s successful term as ASEAN Chair.

The ASEAN Avatar

Recently I heard a BBC report on the Canadian debate over their national animal.  Canada has had the beaver (not the Bieber) as its national animal since the 1970s, but a movement has started to replace it with the more assertive (and aggressive?) polar bear.   This report led to think what the appropriate anthropomorphic symbol for ASEAN should be.

ASEAN already has an emblem, ten rice stalks bound together in unity.  This is a very appropriate symbol, as the united strength of the rice padi stalks is much stronger than that of any one stalk, symbolizing ASEAN consensus. Rice is also common to all of the ASEAN nations.

Unfortunately, the rice stalks are also inanimate.  Other entities have animated symbols:  the United States has a bald eagle, Russia has a bear, China has a panda (or more frequently, a dragon), and France has a chicken.   The EU even has Europa, so a political entity does not have to be a nation to have an avatar.  Hence in political cartoons and other media, other countries and entities have animated avatars, but ASEAN can only be represented as a plant, strong but passive, not engaging with others. 

Obviously this reflects several historical factors, mostly driven by the relative recent nature of ASEAN’s formation and the great diversity of its membership.  Thus, it is harder – but not impossible --  to formulate “ASEAN” traits that should be embodied in a symbol.  So we’ll try.

As an initial matter, cultural and religious issues prevent using a human as the embodiment of ASEAN.   For example, political cartoonists in Singapore avoid drawing caricatures of Singaporean politicians due to local sensitivities. 

Thus, we are left consider animals as potential symbols of ASEAN.  They should be common in the region and represent positive traits of its peoples:

Cat – because dogs and pigs do not have a great reputation in Islam, and mice are associated with disease, these common animals are disqualified.  Cats are common throughout the region, smaller animals that can nevertheless inflict damage when acting in unison.  However, the “herding cats” metaphor would be an inappropriate way to describe the ASEAN way of consensus.

Duck – another popular cartoon animal, ducks are common in ASEAN and are also peaceful, helpful animals.  Being edible might be a drawback, although that never stopped France from using a chicken as its symbol.

Lizard – these small animals are also common in ASEAN, and usefully eat insects.  However, they are also (wrongly) associated with being slimy, not a positive image.

Monkey – also common through ASEAN (even in urbanized Singapore), monkeys are intelligent and work well in groups.  However, the fact that monkeys are closely related to humans yet sub-human may make this animal an uncomfortable choice.

Frog – frogs commonly live in rice paddies and also eat insects.  They are quite vocal and numerous; whether these are positive or negative traits depends on your point of view.

Water Buffalo – this would be my choice.  The water buffalo is a peaceful animal, although with the ability to defend itself with its horns. It is common to ASEAN, laboring in the rice paddies and providing milk and ultimately meat to its owners (the old Far Eastern Economic Review used to have a tiny water buffalo commentator in its political cartoons).  The downside is that the water buffalo is a large and slow animal.

At the end of the day, emblematic symbols and animals are the result of popular sentiments about countries and entities. These sentiments (and perhaps the exhaustion of political cartoonists who don’t want draw 10x anything to depict the ASEAN countries as a group) will determine what is used to depict ASEAN.  Although seemingly trivial, these things are the stuff of creating an ASEAN Community.