The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) has
published a fascinating paper on the ASEAN Secretariat entitled “A Strong
Secretariat, a Strong ASEAN? A Re-evaluation”. Incorporating oral history and written
reflections, this paper provides a socio-political analysis of the ASEAN
Secretariat, positing that the ASEAN Secretariat actually had robust authority
and influence during the pre-Charter era, only to have it eroded by a lack of
resources and support to decline into its current state.
The paper
asserts that the heyday of the ASEAN Secretariat began in 1992 when the
Secretary General of the ASEAN Secretariat became the Secretary General of
ASEAN. With that change in status came higher
salaries and increased resources, which attracted talent from within the
region. Just as importantly, the paper puts
forth that the ASEAN Secretariat assumed a greater role over ASEAN matters
through a combination of geniality and indirect influence, particularly when a
weaker ASEAN member served as the ASEAN Chair (imagine an ASEAN-version of Sir Humphrey Appleby from “Yes,
Minister”).
However, according to the paper, the failure of the ASEAN Secretariat to keep up with market salary levels, an influx of less experienced officers from the newer, less developed ASEAN members, and personnel policies that discouraged staff retention all eroded the overall capability of the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as the ties between the ASEAN Secretariat’s staff and the ASEAN member states, resulting in a decline in its influence on ASEAN. The paper opines that the formalization of the authority of the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Secretary General coincided with, but did not cause, a decline in influence. Yet, according to the paper, the culture of geniality remained, albeit with lessened indirect influence.
However, according to the paper, the failure of the ASEAN Secretariat to keep up with market salary levels, an influx of less experienced officers from the newer, less developed ASEAN members, and personnel policies that discouraged staff retention all eroded the overall capability of the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as the ties between the ASEAN Secretariat’s staff and the ASEAN member states, resulting in a decline in its influence on ASEAN. The paper opines that the formalization of the authority of the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Secretary General coincided with, but did not cause, a decline in influence. Yet, according to the paper, the culture of geniality remained, albeit with lessened indirect influence.
Thus, the paper concludes
that the ASEAN Secretariat actually had strength and authority in the
past. Hence calls to strengthen the
ASEAN Secretariat should be considered with this in mind, e.g., that a
strengthened ASEAN Secretariat is actually a return to a norm rather than an
unprecedented situation. Furthermore, without improving the operating culture
of ASEAN, increasing the formal authority of the ASEAN institutions alone will
not strengthen ASEAN.
I think this paper is a
welcome addition to the very small collection of scholarly material focused on
the ASEAN institutions themselves.
However, I would make some additional points.
First, the purported heyday
of the ASEAN Secretariat in the 1990s and 2000s was a time where ASEAN was
smaller and less formal. This was the
case, in particular, for political-security matters. Since that time, ASEAN and its commitments
have grown significantly, particularly in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Under such circumstances, the ASEAN
Secretariat would necessarily have to take on more formal roles (and has done
so), as the depth and breadth of the AEC has developed. Hence in its AEC role, at least, the ASEAN Secretariat
cannot operate as it did 20-25 years ago (although a stronger ASEAN Secretariat
probably could do so in political-security matters).
Second, the resources,
capability and culture of any international bureaucracy are always
inter-related. For example, there were institutional deficiencies
in the early days of the EU, as salary and status did not keep up with those of national
governments or the private sector. The
EU also has had to incorporate less experienced officers from newer member
states. Yet as the EU strengthened its
institutions with funding and resources, they were able to attract better
officials, creating a virtuous cycle whereby better officials strengthen the
institutions. If the ASEAN leaders were
to make the same commitment to a more professionalized ASEAN Secretariat with
better funding and support, the Secretariat will attract qualified staff from all
across ASEAN and create its own virtuous cycle.
In sum, the paper does shine
a useful light on the unwritten history of the ASEAN Secretariat, showing that
the interactions of a regional organization such as ASEAN do not only depend on
formal rules, but also on the people involved: it is a living entity. I hope
that ASEAN’s leaders keep this in mind as they examine the challenges facing
ASEAN, and the need to strengthen the ASEAN institutions.