It looks like Indonesian
foreign minister Marty Natalegawa has put together a face-saving ASEAN joint
statement on the South China Sea issue.
Although it is impossible to “unring the bell” of the missed ASEAN
foreign ministers’ joint communiqué in Cambodia, the statement should serve as
a marker for the ASEAN Summit to be held in November in Cambodia. It would be extremely humiliating for
Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen to allow a similar episode to occur during the
summit, particularly in the presence of his peers among the ASEAN national
leaders as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum leaders who will also attend the
summit. At least that is the intention
behind the new joint statement. I hope
that is the case.
Thus Indonesia comes through
again to provide leadership in ASEAN, like in last year’s Preah Vihear dispute
between Cambodia and Thailand. But unlike last year, Indonesia had no formal
ASEAN role, as Cambodia is now ASEAN chair, and not Indonesia. Should this be a cause of concern? Not necessarily. Regardless of any formal role in ASEAN, the
relative size and historical legacy of Indonesia will make the country a
natural leader in Southeast Asia. After
all, Germany does not currently hold any formal leadership role in the EU, yet
its leadership in the current Eurozone crisis is not lessened in any way by the
lack of a formal institutional role.
Nevertheless, the impasse
following the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting does highlight the need to
improve the ASEAN institutions. Again, Kavi
Chongvittakorn in the Nation eloquently makes the case for improving the
resources for the ASEAN Secretariat.
Of course, I would
agree. The ASEAN Secretariat does need
more funding, not just to hire more staff and expand its physical plant, but to
improve its institutional memory.
Currently, there are only one or two archivists in the ASEAN Secretariat
who are dealing with mounds of uncatalogued paper records. Getting to grips with this internal
institutional legacy is necessary for ASEAN to cope with the challenges of the
future. Perhaps one of the ASEAN aid
dialogue partners could fund an archival project, if ASEAN is not willing to
fund it.
Beyond improving funding and
staff for the ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN also needs to address the very limited
nature of the ASEAN Secretariat’s powers, at least in ASEAN Economic Community
matters. I
have written about this issue before, and I think this should be reconsidered
during next year’s ASEAN Charter review, which is mandated by Article 50 of the
Charter.
Finally, the impasse in
Cambodia may have validated Vietnam’s choice of foreign affairs vice-minister
Le Luong Minh as ASEAN Secretary-General-designate, at least from its point of
view. Although the ASEAN Secretary General is supposed to represent all of the ASEAN
membership, Vietnam should be assured that he will more than account for its
views on the South China Sea dispute, given both his background and UN
experience.
